

CHAPTER 6

THE SOUTHERN INTERREGNUM AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

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Introduction

The Global South in the early 21st century has become a cauldron of economic and political transformation. On the one hand, economic growth has propelled many southern countries into becoming what the World Bank (2018) has classified as “middle-income” states, notwithstanding that this growth has destabilised global geoeconomic and geopolitical power alignments across the North–South axis. On the other hand, the growth has been accompanied by deepening inequality and pervasive precarity, as evidenced by the fact that middle-income countries in the Global South are now home to over 70 per cent of the world’s poor (Sumner, 2016). In this context, political trajectories across Asia, Latin America, and Africa are undergoing significant transformation, most notably marked by a distinct turn towards the far right.

This turn has assumed different forms across national contexts. In Turkey and India, for instance, it has found expression in the enduring regimes of Recep Erdoğan and Narendra Modi. In countries such as Sri Lanka, Brazil, and the Philippines, in contrast, far-right governments have been more short-lived, but their emergence, nonetheless, signals

the rise of potent reactionary forces across different political terrains. Elsewhere, for example, in South Africa and Indonesia, the new far right exists as significant undercurrents, manifesting partly as nascent political parties and partly as movements situated outside the domain of parliamentary politics. Across national and regional settings in the Global South, the far right propagates populist political vocabularies that construct sharp divisions between an ‘authentic people’ (defined by religion, race and ethnicity, sexuality, or moral attributes) and internal enemies, collectively characterised as an amalgam of ominous Others whose nefarious activities must be controlled by a coercive state.

How should we conceptualise this turn towards right-wing populism in the Global South in the early 21st century? The field of populism studies has, of course, grown into a major academic industry in recent years. Yet, it remains overwhelmingly focused on the Global North and on political style, that is, on how authoritarian right-wing populism is enacted by leaders, parties, and movements. This orientation, often referred to as the performative turn in populism studies, centres on analyses of how right-wing populists rely on a political style founded on the construction of crude ideological binaries between a corrupt elite and a virtuous people, by public displays of aggression, and by political vocabularies that revolve around narratives of crisis and collapse, attributed to the enemies of the people (Moffitt, 2020; Masood & Nisar, 2020; Tuğal, 2021). While this approach has yielded valuable insights into the communicative strategies that authoritarian right-wing populists use to construct collective identities and popular support, it has offered comparatively little regarding the political economy of right-wing populism, particularly in the Global South. That is, it has shed limited light on how the far-right turn in Asia, Latin America, and Africa relates to the interplay between accumulation strategies, class formation, state forms, and major geoeconomic and geopolitical transformations. This chapter seeks to address that lacuna.

Departing from the predominant focus on political style, I propose that far-right politics in the Global South is best understood as a “hegemonic project” (Jessop, 1990:280). I argue that the hegemonic projects of the far right may usefully be conceptualised as a form of

“authoritarian populism” that secures subaltern consent to neoliberal orders within a specific conjuncture of uneven development (see Nilsen, 2025). I advance this argument in two stages. First, I outline an analysis of the present conjuncture in the Global South as an “interregnum” (Gramsci, 1971:276), centred on the exhaustion of the developmental potential of neoliberal accumulation strategies and the ensuing legitimisation crisis which confronts governing elites. Second, I develop an analysis of authoritarian populism as a hegemonic project that addresses this crisis by constructing inter-class support for reactionary politics, which serve to sustain a form of neoliberalism that has entered what Jamie Peck (2010) aptly refers to as its “zombie phase”. In conclusion, I reflect on the implications of this analysis for the future trajectory of democracy and capitalism in the Global South.

On the Southern interregnum

In its 2018 “Poverty and Shared Prosperity” report, the World Bank declared with optimism that only 10 per cent of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty – defined as living on less than \$1.90 per day. In the foreword of the report, then-World Bank President Jim Yong Kim described this as “the lowest poverty rate in recorded history” (World Bank, 2018:xi). The report also identified what it considered the principal driver behind this historical decline in poverty: “The progress has been driven by strong global growth and the rising wealth of many developing countries, particularly in the world’s most populous regions of East Asia and Pacific and South Asia” (World Bank, 2018:1). As is often the case with the World Bank’s assessments of development, the report accurately captured certain dimensions of early 21st century geoeconomic trajectories while omitting others (Nilsen, 2018). It is certainly true that many countries in the Global South have experienced robust growth since the end of the Cold War, enabling them to rise from low-income to middle-income status, as noted above. However, it is equally true, as indicated, that middle-income countries in the Global South remain home to the majority of the world’s poor (Sumner, 2016). How, then, should we interpret this

situation, in which significant growth coexists with persistent poverty, embedded within profoundly uneven and unequal developmental processes?

Some scholars of global development studies contend that the present moment represents a phase of ‘convergence’ between North and South in the world system. They argue that growth processes in the Global South, spearheaded by China, have generated increased revenues enabling countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa to break with the orthodox neoliberal policy regimes previously promoted by the World Bank from the 1980s until the 2000s (see Horner & Hulme, 2019; Jepson, 2020). Additionally, it is asserted that countries in the Global South have transformed their growing geoeconomic strength into enhanced geopolitical influence, challenging Western dominance in established multilateral institutions while simultaneously forging new multilateral bodies such as BRICS (Stuenkel, 2016; Pieterse, 2018; Desai, 2013). Taken together, these trends are said to signal the emergence of a multipolar world order in which United States hegemony no longer holds uncontested sway.

In my view, however, these perspectives fail to capture the true nature of the developmental shifts underway in the Global South in the early 21st century. First, the decline in ‘inter-country inequality’ that is often cited as evidence of North–South convergence has been disproportionately driven by the rise of China. If either China or India were excluded from the data, the reduction in global inequality appears modest or even negligible (Sumner, 2021; Hung, 2021). Second, the policy flexibility made possible by increased revenue flows, largely a consequence of China’s demand for raw materials, proved far less resilient than anticipated during the commodity super-cycle of the early 2000s to mid-2010s (Kiely, 2015). Third, there is little evidence that emerging powers in the Global South have significantly withdrawn from neoliberal policy regimes within multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization. On the contrary, detailed research shows that countries like Brazil, China, and India have often championed free trade principles, insisting that northern and southern states adhere to these rules, even when doing

so undermines less powerful southern economies (Hopewell, 2016, 2022; Hung, 2016). Lastly, multipolarity cannot credibly be seen as an indicator of the rise of an anti-imperialist Global South capable of challenging the imperial power of the North. Instead, greater southern assertiveness in global geopolitics coexists with deep and persistent entanglements between North and South, forming what Li (2024) calls “antagonistic cooperation” that defines the current inter-imperial rivalry (Hung, 2022; Bieler & Morton, 2018: Chapter 7). This rivalry does not herald the end of inequality, precarity, or exploitation in the Global South; rather, it signals the rise of a multipolar order in which emerging powers are increasingly invested in the hyper-exploitation of labour and the consolidation of authoritarian governance (Li, 2023) to remain competitive with established northern centres of capital accumulation and geopolitical influence.

If the present conjuncture cannot be adequately conceptualised as the rise of a Global South which is recalibrating geoeconomic and geopolitical relations, what analytical framework might be more appropriate? My response is to turn to the work of Antonio Gramsci. Writing during the breakdown of the political and economic order that had dominated the 19th and early 20th centuries, Gramsci characterised such a moment as an “interregnum” in which reactionary and progressive forces contest the shape and direction of future development. “The crisis,” he asserted, “consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, 1971:276).

Gramsci’s analysis, which emphasised enduring crisis, political deadlock, and the absence of a newly crystallised hegemonic order, provides an insightful entry point for a “conjunctural analysis” (Hall, 2017) of the Global South in the early 21st century. Unlike views that interpret crises as short-lived transitions between stable phases (Babic, 2020:769), Gramsci conceptualised the interregnum as an organic crisis arising from the internal contradictions of political and economic systems rather than from external shocks (Babic, 2020:771). For Gramsci, an interregnum plays itself out through long, multidimensional and transformative processes animated by eroding

hegemonic authority and contestation among emergent forces seeking to reconstruct hegemony on new foundations. The “morbid symptoms” Gramsci alludes to refer precisely to these emergent hegemonic projects, which are unlikely to resolve the contradictions of a decaying order (Stahl, 2019).

How might we apply this framework to the Global South today? We must return to the trends outlined above: the economic expansion that has allowed many states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to attain middle-income status. It is clear that “a new material expansion”, largely driven by Asia and particularly China (Fernandez et al., 2022:71), has occurred, leading to a shift in global wealth hierarchies. In this regard, Karataşlı and Kumral (2017) argue that the world-system has moved from a historically stable “trimodal” structure of global wealth distribution, which prevailed in the 20th century, towards the current “quadrимodal” configuration. In the trimodal pattern, sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia formed the periphery of the world system, southern and eastern Europe, western Asia, and Latin America constituted the semi-periphery, while western Europe and North America composed the core. The new quadrимodal order consists of “a lower periphery, an upper periphery, a new expanded semi-periphery, and core regions” (Karataşlı & Kumral, 2017:48), with most emerging powers in the Global South located in the expanded semi-periphery as middle-income countries.

A defining feature of this expanded semi-periphery, as indicated, is that it also remains the epicentre of persistent poverty. As Sumner (2016) has demonstrated, middle-income countries in the South account for around 70 per cent of the world’s poor, measured against a poverty line of \$2.50 per day (Kanbur & Sumner, 2012). Crucially, poverty in these countries is not due to an absolute scarcity of resources but stems from the unequal distribution of wealth generated by recent growth (Sumner, 2016). Moreover, graduation out of absolute poverty remains highly precarious and the working classes of the Global South largely inhabit what Sumner (2021:3) terms “a fuzzy zone between absolute poverty and security from future poverty”, with various forms and intensities of precarity constituting the norm (Sumner, 2021:3, 36).

This situation is in large part the consequence of how, particularly since the 1990s, growth in the Global South has become dependent on integration into global value chains (GVCs). According to Sumner (2021), whilst GVC integration has enabled many low-income countries to ascend to middle-income status, the developmental benefits derived from participation in these value chains tend to decline over time, leading instead to “a diminished form of industrialisation” (Sumner, 2021:8) based on limited productivity gains and export growth. This has led to “stalled industrialisation accompanied by tertiarisation” (Sumner, 2021:10) and ultimately to an “immiserating form of economic growth” (Sumner, 2021:92), characterised by declining wages, weak employment growth, and expanding informal sectors. The net effect has been growing inequality within these countries and what Sumner characterises as “a transition from global poverty to global precarity” (Sumner, 2021:36; see also Kvangraven, 2021; Selwyn, 2019).

This trend represents a damning indictment of the neoliberal accumulation strategies that have shaped global economic activity since the 1990s. Whether through GVC integration or financialisation, neoliberalism has exhausted its developmental potential in the Global South. Indeed, neoliberalisation seems to have produced what Carroll refers to as “the death of development”, a model of capitalist accumulation premised on “broad-based cultivation of low-level, profit-oriented activity” (Carroll, 2016:140), incapable of driving the structural transformation traditionally associated with development (Carroll, 2023; Li, 2017).

These developmental contradictions lie at the heart of what I refer to as the southern interregnum of the early 21st century. For large sections of the population, neoliberal accumulation strategies fail to secure livelihoods beyond precarity, generating legitimisation crises that threaten to destabilise the hegemony of governing elites and dominant groups across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The 2010s, widely described as the decade of “mass protest” (Bevins, 2023), bear testament to this, commencing with the Arab uprisings of 2011 and culminating in widespread protests in Chile, Lebanon, India, and

Hong Kong in 2019. Analysis of this wave of protests suggests that it was fuelled by “militant and ascendant working classes” alongside “growing sections of unemployed, excluded, and increasingly restive workers” (Karataşlı et al., 2015:197). Offensive protests “advancing new claims” intersected with defensive protests rallying around “previously won gains”, combined with rising class-based protests by surplus populations pushed into what Denning (2010) calls “wageless life” (Bernards & Soederberg, 2021; Li, 2017; Neilson & Stubbs, 2011).

This is not to suggest that all protests in the Global South in this era can be reduced to capital-labour conflicts. Rather, diverse issues, including democratic rights, corruption, gender and racial justice, and public service provision, have sparked widespread resistance. Yet, the emerging geography of poverty concentrated within these new middle-income countries remains highly volatile, posing serious challenges to existing hegemonic configurations even in emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Fundamentally, the southern interregnum revolves around the unresolved tension between the twin imperatives of accumulation and legitimation that all capitalist states must reconcile (O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1984). In the early 21st century, elites across emerging powers confront increasingly complex disjunctions between these imperatives, which in turn fuel waves of popular protest. Recent developments in Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, Kenya, and Bangladesh suggest that such disjunctions will remain a defining feature of Global South political economies for the foreseeable future.

The responses to these crises take shape through hegemonic projects that attempt to reconcile accumulation and legitimation by mobilising support for national programmes of action – programmes that represent class-specific interests as national interests (Jessop, 1990:208; Stahl, 2019:340). Such projects construct elite alliances while securing subaltern consent through what Gramsci (1971:161) called a “compromise equilibrium” between dominant and subordinate interests. Importantly, hegemonic projects are intimately tied to specific accumulation strategies and their capacity to balance intra-capital relations and capital-labour dynamics: “It is thereby conditioned

and limited by the accumulation process” (Jessop, 1990:208). The particular ways in which these hegemonic projects operate in the southern interregnum, and how they shape the political economy of development in the early 21st century, can only be discerned through concrete empirical analysis. Accordingly, in the final section of this chapter, I examine one such hegemonic project, *authoritarian populism* (Hall, 2017), which has gained increasing traction across the Global South in the past decade and reflect on its implications for the future of development and democracy in the region.

On Southern authoritarian populism

In the first decade of the new millennium, many states across the Global South shifted decisively towards the far right. Foreshadowed by Recep Erdoğan’s rise in Türkiye during the early 2000s, a wave of authoritarian populism swept figures such as Mahinda Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka), Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines), and Narendra Modi (India) into power with substantial popular mandates (Tuğal, 2009; Karataşlı & Kumral, 2023; Wickramasinghe, 2022; Lapper, 2021; Curato, 2016; Nilsen, 2021). More recently, Javier Milei’s 2023 victory over centre-left candidate Sergio Massa in Argentina reaffirmed this trend, while in South Africa and Indonesia, authoritarian populism is emerging as a powerful undercurrent which threatens to reshape these countries’ political terrains (Rojas, 2024; Love, 2022; Yasih & Hadiz, 2023).

The rise of authoritarian populism is intimately tied to the political economy of the southern interregnum discussed previously. Authoritarian populism in the South constitutes one of the most explicit Gramscian morbid symptoms to emerge as a consequence of this interregnum, as governing elites attempt to reconstruct hegemony amidst the turbulence of exhausted neoliberal accumulation (Nilsen, 2024a, 2024b). Faced with widespread popular unrest, many governing elites have deployed authoritarian populism to secure subaltern consent for hegemonic projects that extend the lifespan of accumulation strategies whose developmental potential has been largely depleted.

As Stuart Hall (2017) has argued, authoritarian populism rests on political vocabularies that draw a boundary between what are deemed an authentic people and their internal enemies. Though originally developed to analyse Thatcherism in 1970s and 1980s Britain, Hall's conceptualisation remains highly relevant to the Global South in the early 21st century. Across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these projects construct a virtuous people, defined by religion, race, ethnicity, sexuality, or morality, who must be defended from an amalgam of Others: religious minorities, racial and ethnic subalterns, queer communities, foreigners, criminal underclasses, dissenters, and corrupt elites. State coercion is framed as necessary to protect the people from these internal threats, while strongman leaders guide national prosperity (Nilsen, 2024a, 2024b).

Strikingly, these hegemonic projects have achieved cross-class support, fusing together economic elites, emergent middle classes, and precarious working classes. In Brazil, for example, Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign employed a populist discourse that pitted hardworking, law-abiding citizens against criminal elements, promising to unleash state power to restore order. Bolsonaro ultimately secured 55 per cent of the vote, including support from working-class voters who had experienced moderate social mobility under the Workers' Party which had been in power for the previous decade and a half (Hunter & Power, 2019; Rocha et al., 2021; Webber, 2020; Nunes, 2020; Chaguri & do Amaral, 2023; Evans, 2020).

A similar pattern unfolded in the Philippines, where Duterte won the 2016 presidency by appealing strongly to the working poor (Curato, 2016). As Thompson (2022:17) notes, Duterte's authoritarian populism conveniently diverted attention from the failure of economic growth to alleviate poverty in what was the poorest country in the ASEAN region. Duterte fused middle-class anxieties about social decline with the frustrations of the poor over stagnating economic growth and succeeded in constructing broad support without fundamentally departing from the tenets of neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Ramos, 2021).

In India, Narendra Modi has achieved three consecutive electoral victories for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by dramatically

expanding support among lower-caste groups and the poor (Jaffrelot, 2021). While the BJP's Hindu nationalist project was historically rooted in upper castes and affluent classes (Jaffrelot, 1996), Modi's electoral landslides in 2014 and 2019 were driven by his success in mobilising Dalits, other lower castes, and the working poor. Between 2004 and 2019, the BJP's share of lower-caste support increased from 23 per cent to 44 per cent, Dalit support from 13 per cent to 34 per cent, and poor voters from 16 per cent to 36 per cent. In 2019, the BJP secured backing from 44 per cent of Hindu voters across class and caste divides (Nilsen, 2023). Although the 2024 election weakened the BJP's parliamentary dominance, Hindu nationalism remains a formidable political force (Nilsen, 2024b).

These developments raise a key question: how is subaltern consent secured for authoritarian populist projects that advance neoliberal accumulation while deepening inequality and precarity? This chapter can only outline the contours of an answer, focusing on how authoritarian populism taps into complex "structures of feeling" (Williams, 1977) that permeate precarious subaltern life worlds. Harry Pettit (2019), in his work on unemployed youth in Egypt, identifies emotional cultures of precarity as instances where aspirations of upward mobility coexist with feelings of frustration and anxiety over potential decline. These affective contradictions are pervasive in zones of enduring precarity across the Global South, and authoritarian populism has been instrumental in channelling them into political support for dominant groups as part of an ongoing hegemonic project.

In Brazil, Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco (2020) illustrate how Bolsonaro's support among subaltern urban voters emerged from conservative subjectivities shaped by fragile social mobility under the Workers' Party and subsequent economic crises. Male workers, in particular, aspire to middle-class social status and are fearful of descending into poverty. These men, they argue, "built their identities as masculine breadwinners in opposition to those whose life was supposedly easy: [vagabonds] who receive social benefits, or unpunished bandits who, according to them, get things without working for them [...]" This narrative is necessarily structured upon

frustration and resentment, as well as a profound feeling of individual injustice that pitted the law-abiding worker against the [vagabond]" (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco, 2020:17–18). The rise of violent crime exacerbated anxieties, allowing Bolsonaro to harness law-and-order narratives that cast hardworking citizens against criminal deviants (Nunes, 2020).

Similarly, in the Philippines, Curato (2016) has shown how Duterte's success lay in simultaneously activating hope for economic improvement and anxiety about violent crime. Kusaka (2017a, 2017b, 2020) argues that Duterte's rhetoric resonated with the "moral politics" of the urban poor, offering a neoliberal moral universe that contrasted virtuous entrepreneurial citizens with immoral criminals – especially drug offenders. In so doing, Duterte's rise marked a major shift in the hegemonic moral discourse and reflected a desire for discipline that cut across class lines.

These cases illustrate how the hegemonic project of southern authoritarian populism has succeeded in mobilising widespread support by addressing "real problems, real and lived experiences, [and] real contradictions" (Hall, 2017:185–186) in ways that bind subaltern structures of feeling to far-right politics and the reinforcement of neoliberalism. The effectiveness of the programme, however, varies across contexts, as reflected in the varying longevity of these regimes. Bolsonaro's tenure lasted one term, but his presidency cemented the far right's position within Brazilian politics (Silva, 2023). In the Philippines, Duterte exited office in 2022, but handed power to Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos, who appointed Duterte's daughter as vice president and appears committed to an authoritarian trajectory (Curato, 2022).

In other cases, authoritarian populism has proven more enduring, offering deeper insight into its ability to secure subaltern consent. Modi's India exemplifies the durability of such a hegemonic project. Despite losing an outright majority in 2024 and being compelled to enter into a coalition government, the BJP remains central to what Jaffrelot and Verniers (2020) term India's "new political system", rooted in neoliberal Hindu nationalism (Nilsen, 2023). Modi's hegemonic project has

expanded support among lower castes, Dalits, and the poor in a context of deepening inequality where the top 10 per cent earn 50 per cent of national income and hold 65 per cent of the wealth, while the bottom 50 per cent earn only 13 per cent of income and own 6 per cent of the wealth. This occurred during the period between 2014 and 2022, when real wages for agricultural, construction, and non-agricultural workers grew by less than one per cent annually (Drèze, 2023).

Modi and the BJP succeeded in averting this social crisis from becoming a political one by offering “psychological wages” (Du Bois, 2014), a sense of belonging and dignity derived from inclusion within the Hindu nation. As Chacko (2018:31) argues, Modi’s project creates an entrepreneurial consumer regulated by Hindu nationalist culture, advancing personal mobility and national strength (see also Kaur, 2020; Cross, 2014; Jakobsen & Nielsen, 2020; Jaffrelot, 2021:103–111). This dual promise, of development and dignity, appeals to those precariously positioned near poverty, while offering lower-caste citizens symbolic elevation through Hinduness, in contradistinction to Muslims and Pakistanis (Jaffrelot, 2021:347). Sustained by the organisational network of the Hindu nationalist movement, active since the 1920s, these psychological wages reinforce popular trust in Modi’s government, providing cohesion for his hegemonic project. This cohesion may continue to drive rising inequality and democratic backsliding as India’s secular democracy undergoes deeper autocratisation. In this sense, Modi’s India offers a disturbing preview of what authoritarian populist hegemonic projects may entail for states and societies across Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the southern interregnum extends further into the 21st century.

Conclusion

The rise of authoritarian populism in the Global South reflects a deep structural crisis within neoliberal capitalism. As neoliberal accumulation strategies exhaust their developmental potential, elites across Asia, Africa, and Latin America face increasingly volatile tensions between accumulation and legitimation. Authoritarian

populism has emerged as a hegemonic response to these tensions: it mobilises subaltern consent by tapping into the lived experiences of precarity, while simultaneously protecting the accumulation strategies of the elite that prolong inequality, exclusion, and informalisation.

Crucially, these projects do not simply manipulate or manufacture consent. They engage real contradictions – economic stagnation, stalled mobility, rising insecurity – but displace blame onto internal enemies, reframing structural crises as moral crises of lawlessness, corruption, or cultural deviance. In doing so, they offer subordinate groups the psychological wages of belonging to an authentic, virtuous people while marginalising those designated as threats to national cohesion. Through this dynamic, authoritarian populism converts widespread disaffection into support for projects that leave underlying political-economic contradictions unresolved or indeed exacerbated. Furthermore, authoritarian populism is not a uniform or guaranteed solution for the crisis of ruling elites. Its capacity to construct durable hegemonic projects varies across national contexts, shaped by local histories of class formation, state capacity, and institutional legacies. In Brazil and the Philippines, as discussed, authoritarian populist regimes were able to capture the state but struggled to stabilise a new hegemonic order beyond one or two electoral cycles. In India, conversely, Hindu nationalism under Modi has successfully reconfigured state and society, achieving remarkable inter-class and inter-caste support while entrenching neoliberal Hindu nationalist rule.

More broadly, the durability of these projects raises sobering questions about the future trajectory of democracy and capitalism in the Global South. The southern interregnum appears set to persist as accumulation strategies continue to falter while political orders fragment. In this space, authoritarian populism offers an increasingly attractive solution for elites struggling to govern volatile societies. Its expansion deepens the risks of democratic erosion, intensified repression, exclusionary nationalism, and the normalisation of inequality as a structural feature of 21st century capitalism. This is an unsettling prospect, namely that authoritarian populism may not simply represent a transitory political moment but rather a

stable form of rule within the ongoing reorganisation of global capitalism. As the southern interregnum extends further into the 21st century, authoritarian populism offers a political formula capable of simultaneously managing social unrest and reproducing neoliberal political economies marked by precarity, exclusion, and fragmented democracies.

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